Ukraine, Partnerships and GEOINT – DGI 2023 Could Not Be More Relevant

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 was no surprise. Intelligence from a wide range of sources, especially USA and UK, agreed that war was coming back to Europe. General Sir Jim Hockenhull, who is familiar as a regular DGI keynote speaker, on 16th February 2022 took the unprecedented step of announcing that Russian tanks amassing on the Ukraine border were not pulling back as Russia claimed. Indeed, the next day Defence Intelligence published a map depicting Putin's possible axes of invasion, in particular showing Kiev as a target from Belorussia. Notably, Defence Intelligence has continued publishing maps of Russia dispositions, placing it firmly in public limelight.

GEOINT plays a part in this intelligence. Much of the source will be from commercial earth observation that, for example, famously showed Russian Forces at a standstill, concentrated and vulnerable on the approaches to Kiev. Commercial imagery and AI have also contributed to civil assessments on the cost oof rebuilding Ukraine. Even the Russians purchased commercial satellite imagery in April, such was their need for better intelligence and, I suspect, understanding of their own force’s situation. But the true picture, Putin's evil intent, required multi-source intelligence integration, made harder when Russian tactical formations themselves did not know they would invade until 24 hours beforehand.

Interestingly, also hampering the advance, Russian troops had old maps and map-reading was appalling, contributing to the situation north of Kiev. In contrast, the Ukrainians defending Kiev had recently produced mapping and data, thanks to the generosity of the Norwegian Government supporting Ukraine's economic development.

The coordinated response by NATO and NATO nations demonstrates that intelligence was being shared, perhaps to an unprecedented extent given some of the speculated sources. Blindingly obviously Ukraine is not a NATO nation, yet it appeared to be receiving the same, and perhaps better, intelligence. The ability to strike Russian ammunition depots with deep fires halted the Russian advance in the east. Good GEOINT will have been essential, supplemented by the use of UAVs capable of target acquisition such as the Ukrainian TB2, especially when combatting Russian manoeuvre. (UAVs have proved exceptionally useful and are seen as an 'all arms' asset. They are, however, very vulnerable and thus expendable).

Ukraine is today’s front line against an enemy set on forcefully occupying an independent European country and on confronting NATO. Europe and NATO are Ukraine's depth, whether providing arms and munitions or intelligence, and one day helping Ukraine rebuild and integrate into the European Union. This sharing of intelligence outside of formal alliances is now commonplace given the predominance of recent ad hoc coalitions, or 'Alliance Plus' operations such as during NATO's lead in Afghanistan. We know how to do it, although challenges over system interoperability remain. National GEOINT may not be sharable in its pure form but as much as could be shared would be, depending on the trust placed in a partner. Towards the end of British operations in Helmand, as Afghan's took the lead, Defence Geographic Centre was producing maps in Dari script and imagery was being released to Afghan forces.

Ukraine lessons for GEOINT are evident in RUSI's 30th November special report examining preliminary lessons from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I am taken by two in particular.

Firstly, that continual 'eyes on' and long-range deep fires creates an imperative to disperse forces and then concentrate quickly. This places a massive burden on geographic staffs that I suspect is not yet fully understood. The Russians used old mapping with roads and towns completely missing - we need continually updated geospatial data and mapping, including going information, so that changes such as flooded waterways and blown bridges are in the database to support the mobility needs of this disperse and concentrate philosophy. But, equally, deployed geospatial analysts will have commanders demanding rapid manoeuvre support advice to disperse forces whilst delivering concentrated effects, and thereafter to concentrate mass to deliver decisive punch faster than an enemy can react.

The second lesson is the 'right to precision'. But that is a subject for a later blog.

DGI 2023 covers all this and more. Day 2 examines GEOINT alliances, communities and partnerships. General Jurgen Brotz will give us the NATO view on partnerships at a time when Europe hangs under the clouds of war. Major General Michelle McGuiness, DIA’s Deputy Director Commonwealth Integration, will help NGA and 42 Engineer Regiment (Geographic) draw out Ukraine GEOINT lessons. Leveraging commercial satellite imagery for asymmetric advantage in the light of Ukraine will be interesting, especially to hear vendors views on whether tactical deception is possible in the future. And, as we consider the maritime domain, collaboration in APAC will be explored as its importance increases given threats from another authoritarian regime.

Download the DGI 2023 brochure to find out more, and book online today. Save up to £500 registering by Friday 27th January!